摘要
基于主权财富基金一次违背承诺将被永久性禁止进入东道国投资的前提,通过构建声誉模型,研究了主权财富基金与东道国的投资博弈关系,以指导我国主权财富基金投资实践。研究表明:在较为现实的假定条件下,主权财富基金是否违背承诺取决于其短期收益和长期机会成本的大小;同时,进入东道国的投资动机越强烈,主权财富基金越不容易进入东道国市场:而东道国对主权财富基金的警惕程度则受制于主权财富基金的风险偏好程度、让渡价值比率、投资效用贴现率、投资风险,以及主权财富基金在东道国期望获得的投资收益增长率等因素,东道国政府对主权财富基金设置投资壁垒和障碍对双方都不利。
Based on the premise that a default will lead Sovereign Wealth Funds to be permanently banned to invest in the host country,this article studies the investment game relations of Sovereign Wealth Funds and the host country through building a reputation model.Research shows that whether Sovereign Wealth Funds is in default or not depends on the size of its short-term gain and long-term cost under the condition of more realis-tic assumptions.Meanwhile the stronger the investment motivation of entering the host country,the more diffi-cult it is for Sovereign Wealth Funds to enter the host country.And the degree of vigilance of host country, which is for Sovereign Wealth Funds,is subject to the risk preference of Sovereign Wealth Funds,the rate of delivery value,the utility discount rate of investment income and the investment risk,as well as the growth rate of investment income that Sovereign Wealth Funds expects to get in host country.That the host country sets in-vestment barriers and obstacles for Sovereign Wealth Funds is bad for both sides.
出处
《昆明理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2013年第6期48-55,共8页
Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"我国主权财富基金对外投资战略研究"(11XJY023)
云南省教育厅重点项目"我国主权财富基金对外投资战略和实现机制"(2001Z080)
关键词
主权财富基金
违背承诺
声誉模型
东道国
投资壁垒
Sovereign Wealth Funds
default
reputation model
host country
investment barriers
