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官员交流、任期与经济一体化——来自省级经验的证据 被引量:20

Subnational Leader's Rotation,Tenure and Economic Integration——Evidence from China
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摘要 近年来,国家有意通过干部交流来促进省区间的平衡发展,国内外学者也对官员交流做了大量研究,但大多是被纳入经济增长的分析框架中,还缺乏其对经济一体化影响的定量研究。本文系统考察了省级官员跨省交流及任期对区域经济一体化的影响。研究发现,交流能够显著促进国内市场整合;书记比省(市)长的促进作用更强,如果书记交流的水平提高1%,市场整合水平提高0.183%;平行交流比垂直交流的促进作用更强,高出9.52%。研究进一步发现,官员交流促进经济一体化存在时滞效应,官员任期与经济一体化的关系呈现正U型特征。研究还发现,官员交流对一体化的影响在地区之间存在着明显差异,对东部的促进作用强于中西部。本文是对已有理论文献的拓展,从实证角度验证了已有理论的正确性,并对我国官员治理制度的完善提供一定的证据支持。 The central government intends to promote the rotation of subnational leader in order to balance economic development between different regions. There are lots of researches on the rotation of subnational leaders,especially in the framework of economic growth,but less quantitative researches about the impact on the economic integration. This paper studies the impact of leader's rotation and tenure on economic integration. We find that governor's rotation can promote regional integration significantly and the secretory plays a more impor-tant role than the governor. The level of rotation increases by 1%,economic integration will be increased by 0.183%. Compared with exchange from central government,the parallel rotation promotes 9.52% higher. There is a certain lag effect of rotation on economic integration,the relationship between tenure and economic integration exhibits a U-shaped feature. Impact of rotationon economic integration is different between the east and the middle-west,which the east is much larger.In this paper,we provide the emperical evidence for the establishing institution of Chinese official governance.
出处 《公共管理学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第4期57-67,139-140,共11页 Journal of Public Management
关键词 官员交流 交流任期 经济一体化 Subnational Leader's Rotation,Tenure,Economic Integration
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