期刊文献+

基于泊松跳跃的并购时机研究 被引量:2

Research on Timing of M&A Based on Poisson Jump
在线阅读 下载PDF
导出
摘要 在同时考虑协同效应与泊松跳跃的情形下,运用实物期权思想与最优停时方法探讨了并购时机问题。在主并方与被并方价值均不确定但存在一定相关性的条件下,通过构建被并方不抵触并购情形下的单方并购模型,求解出了在考虑泊松跳跃与不考虑泊松跳跃情形下的最佳并购时机及其对应的并购区域;研究发现泊松跳跃的存在使主并方获得更多等待期权的价值,但也使并购阈值右移,并购区域变宽,选择最佳并购时机需要更多的信息支持。 Taking both synergistic effect and Poisson jump into account, the paper studies the timing of M&A using the method of real option and optimal stopping. Through the establishment of the M&A model with two players, in which both of the players' value are uncertain but related, and the acquainted player accepts the M&A without condition, the paper solves the optimal timing of M&A and corresponding region to make decision under the condition where Poisson jump exists and the condition where Poisson jump does not exist. The result shows that the company 1 will obtain more value of waiting option but narrower M&A region with Poisson jump comparing with that without Poisson jump.
作者 张立 扈文秀
出处 《西安理工大学学报》 CAS 北大核心 2013年第4期495-499,共5页 Journal of Xi'an University of Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70973096) 陕西省高校重点学科专项资金资助项目(107-00X902)
关键词 并购时机 协同效应 最优停时 泊松跳跃 timing of M&A synergistic effect optimal stopping Poisson jump
  • 相关文献

参考文献17

  • 1Lambrecht M. The timing and terms of mergers-motivated by economies of scale [ J ]. Journal of Financial Econom- ics, 2004, 72 (1):41-62.
  • 2Alvarez, L, Stenbacka R. Takeover timing, implementa- tion uncertainty, and embedded divestment options [ J ]. Review of Finance, 2006, 10: 417-441.
  • 3Thijssen J J J. Optimal and strategic timing of mergers and acquisitions motivated by synergies and risk diversifi- cation [ J ]. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 2008, 32 : 1701-1720.
  • 4Hoberg G, Phillips G. Product market synergies and competition in mergers and acquisitions: a text-based a- nalysis [ J ]. Review of Financial Studies, 2010, 23, 3773 -3811.
  • 5Maksimovic V, Phillips G, Prabhala N R. Post-merger restructuring and the boundaries of the firms [ J ]. Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102, 317-343.
  • 6Yuri K. Preemptive bidding in takeover auctions with af- filiated values [ J ] The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2012,52:395-401.
  • 7金治明.无限期美式期权定价与马氏链的最优停止[J].经济数学,2003,20(2):7-12. 被引量:1
  • 8黄薇,曹国华.不确定下项目投资时点的优化模型研究[J].系统工程学报,2003,18(6):521-525. 被引量:7
  • 9曹黄金.一维扩散过程的最优停止问题的研究[J].数学理论与应用,2006,26(2):21-23. 被引量:1
  • 10边璐,扈文秀,张立.主并方合作并购目标公司的时机问题研究初步[J].系统工程,2009,27(5):82-87. 被引量:13

二级参考文献91

共引文献36

同被引文献35

  • 1田素华,谢智勇.中美两国经济周期波动的差异性与协同性研究[J].世界经济研究,2020,0(3):72-94. 被引量:5
  • 2张学超,宣国良.战略并购的时机选择研究[J].华东交通大学学报,2006,23(5):156-158. 被引量:1
  • 3Slusky A R, Caves R E. Synergy, agency and the deter- minants of premium paid in mergers[J]. Journal of In- dustrial Economics, 1991,39 (3) : 77-296.
  • 4朱宝宪.中国并购评论[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2003.
  • 5Moeller T. Let's make a deal! How shareholders control impacts merger payoff[J]. Journal of Financial Econom- ics,2005,76(1) : 167-190.
  • 6Bargeron L L. Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers? [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008,89 (3) : 375-390.
  • 7Chahine S, Ismai[ A. Premium merger fees and the choice of investment banks:a simultaneous analysis[J]. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2009, 49(2) :159-177.
  • 8Wan K M,Wong K F. Economic impact of political bar- riers to cross-border acquisitions: an empirical study of CNOOCs unsuccessful takeover of Unocal[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2009,15 (4) : 447-468.
  • 9Rafael L P, Floreneio L, Andrei S, et al. Investor pro- tection and corporate valuation[J]. The Journal of Fi- nance,2002,57(3) :1147-1170.
  • 10David S, Stein J C. The dark side of internal capital markets: divisional rentseeking and inefficient invest ment[J]. Journal of Finance, 2000,55 (6) : 2537-2564.

引证文献2

二级引证文献10

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部