摘要
构建一个完全信息的两阶段动态博弈模型,并假设开源创新项目的领导者通过选择不同的开源授权协议来影响开源社区和开源厂商的参与激励,从而使开源创新活动尽可能得到所有参与者最大限度的支持。结论显示,在单个厂商参与的情况下,开源项目的领导者会根据不同的开源商业模式,来调整开源创新开放性的严格程度,以此最大化整体的激励效果。然而,随着参与厂商的增多,开源授权协议将倾向于采用"严格开放授权"。总体来看,商业参与不会影响开源创新的开放性,甚至有可能会起到强化的作用。
This paper attempts to study the influence of business involvement on open source inno- vation from the perspective of licensing scheme. In a two-stage dynamic game with complete informa- tion, the licensor of an open source project tries to manipulate incentives of community and firm by choosing different license agreements so as to maximize total contribution to open source project. The results indicate that openness of open source innovation is influenced by firm＇s complementary bene- fits from contributing to open source project when only one firm is involved; however, restrictive li- cense is preferred when more firms choose to participate. Overall, openness of open source innovation will not be undermined by business involvement and may be enhanced.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第12期1799-1804,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71103084
71273128)
教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(11YJA790159)
江苏高校优势学科建设工程项目
关键词
授权
激励
开源创新
licensing
motivation
open source innovation
