摘要
规制政策选择不只是一个技术问题或计算问题,因为政策选择过程是一个政治过程。作为平衡利益冲突的产物,规制政策是政治博弈均衡的结果。在政治博弈中,政治制度框架、利益相关者行为、规制政策制定程序、意识形态和突发事件等会影响规制政策选择。立法机构、司法机构、利益集团、企业和公民等之间的相互博弈,在有助于规制政策合理化的同时,也会决定规制的权利分配,改变规制的成本收益,影响规制的强度和导致规制效率损失。
Regulation policy choice is not merely a technical question because policy choice is a politi- cal process. As a product of balancing interest conflicts, regulation policy is the result of political game equilibrium. In politics, framework of political system, stakeholder＇s behavior, regulation policy-mak- ing process, ideology and unexpected events affect regulation policy choices. Interactions among legisla- tive and judicial institutions, interest groups, enterprises and citizens, etc. , help to rationalize regula- tion. At the same time, these interactions also decide on right allocation and change costs and benefits, which affects the strength of regulation and leads to loss in regulation efficiency.
出处
《福建行政学院学报》
2013年第5期9-14,40,共7页
Journal of Fujian Administration Institute
基金
厦门大学985工程"公共管理重点学科建设"项目
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-09-0672)
关键词
规制政策选择
政治博弈
内生因素
外在影响
Regulation policy choice
Political game
Endogenous factor
External influence
