摘要
我国上市公司存在着过度投资行为,这种过度投资行为的原因解释均是从代理理论进行的。行为金融学认为,管理者的过度自信也会引发过度投资问题。本文从管理者的过度自信角度出发,实证检验了管理者的过度自信会导致企业过度投资的假说在我国上市公司身上是成立的,即使存在融资约束时,过度自信的管理者也会产生过度投资行为。
There is evidence that Chinese listed companies invest excessively what it is really needed. Some literatures believe that this overinvestment behavior is due to the agency problem. However, the behavior finance does not agree this kind of explanation. It argues that the managerial overconfidence may also trigger overinvestment. Enlightened by the behavior finance theory, this paper would empirically study the relationship between managers＇ overconfidence and corporate overinvestment in listed companies. The conclusion illustrates that managerial overconfidence may cause the overinvestment problem which also exists in Chinese listed companies. Overconfident managers prefer cash -flow and debt to satisfy the demand of investing, even if there is a financing constraint.
出处
《企业经济》
北大核心
2013年第10期54-57,共4页
Enterprise Economy
关键词
过度自信
管理者
过度投资
overconfidence
managers
overinvestment
