摘要
本文运用静态博弈与二阶段动态博弈模型分析中国银行业管制放松对银行利润、社会福利和信贷供给的影响。在短期,管制放松导致每家在位国有银行利润、银行业总利润趋于不断下降,社会福利不断得到提升、信贷供给不断增加;并且静态博弈下的银行利润大于二阶段动态博弈下的银行利润,社会福利和信贷供给则小于二阶段动态博弈下的社会福利和信贷供给;但在长期不会随着进一步放松管制而发生变化。此外,本文认为政府对国有银行利润存在偏好是导致我国民营性质的潜在进入者在管制放松时受到歧视的主要原因。
This paper uses the static game model and the two - stage dynamic game model to analyze the effects of banking deregulation on the bank＇ s profits, social welfare and the credit supplies. In the short time, the deregulation will result in the profits of the state - owned banks and the total profits of banking decreasing, but the social welfare and the credit supplies increasing. Also, the profits of the state - owned banks and total profits of banking under the static game model are higher than that under the two - stage dynamic game model. The opposite conclusion applies to the social welfare and the credit supplies. However, it keeps the same in the long time. In addition, the potential private banks will be discriminated by the regulator due to the preference to the profits of the state - owned banks.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期108-114,共7页
Economic Review
