摘要
运用演化博弈理论建立政府与企业环境技术创新的互动决策博弈模型,分四种情况讨论了政府和企业的演化稳定策略。研究得出,当企业从环境技术创新中获得的收益比大于其成本收益比或者政府的创新资助率较高时,企业倾向于选择主动创新;如企业的创新能力较强,其创新收益越大,这时即使政府提高环境税也不会影响企业的创新积极性。
This paper used evolutionary game theory to establish the interactive decision - making game model between government and enter- prise, and discussed in detail from four eases the evolutionary stable strategy of government and enterprise. The result showed that, when the return ra- tio obtained from the enterprise environmental technology innovation more than the cost benefit ratio, or the government＇s innovation fund rate was high, the enterprises tended to select the active innovation, if the enterprise innovation ability was stronger, the innovation income was bigger, then even if the government improved the environment tax,it did not affect the enterprises innovation enthusiasm.
出处
《资源开发与市场》
CAS
CSSCI
2013年第11期1133-1136,共4页
Resource Development & Market
基金
国家社科基金青年项目(编号:13CJY045)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(编号:11YJC790078)
河南省高等学校人文社会科学研究重点项目(编号:2013-ZD-059)
关键词
环境技术创新
成本收益比
环境税
演化博弈
environmental technology innovation
cost benefit ratio
environmental tax
evolutionary game
