摘要
针对工业园区废弃物排放企业和利用企业之间的信息不对称导致的有限理性条件下生态协作各方为实现自身经济利益诉求而持续重复博弈并进而影响园区工业生态系统稳定性的问题,以进化博弈理论为分析工具,研究了工业园区生态系统演化的稳定性。研究结果表明:工业园区内部可通过建立收益分成机制、内部惩戒机制和协作文化培养机制以及采取增加个体产能、提高废物利用效率等的内控措施来实现园区工业生态系统的持续稳定演化。
Aiming at the problem that the asymmetric information between the industrial waste generation enterprise and the utilization enterprise in industrial park resulting in the repeated game and influencing the stability of industrial ecosystem in industrial park,this paper analyzes the stability of industrial ecosystem evolution by using the evolutionary game theory.The results show that industrial ecosystem could realize the stably development through establishing the mechanisms such as right revenue allocation mechanism,inner penalty mechanism,collaboration culture cultivation mechanism,and implementing the inner measures to improve individual capability and waste using efficiency.
出处
《技术经济》
CSSCI
2013年第9期87-92,117,共7页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目"基于产业网络与生态网络耦合的工业园区生态化研究"(71003017)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目"竞争企业间知识扩散的行为难题及彼此间学习的内在逻辑--以智能手机产业为例"(N110406006)
关键词
工业园区
工业生态系统
进化博弈
内控机制
industrial park
industrial ecosystem
evolutionary game
inner control mechanism
