摘要
[摘要]会计盈余时效性反映了企业会计收益信息与实际经营成果的结合程度，是监督、评价经理人当期努力影响未来业绩的重要指标。根据委托代理理论中与股东利益相融合的薪酬委员会结构旨在增强经理人薪酬契约设计有效性的观点，对2010-2011年我国A股主板909家上市公司以加权最小二乘回归的分析结果显示，与股东诱因融合度高的薪酬委员会结构能够增强经理人薪酬-绩效敏感度，同时能够根据当期会计盈余时效性调整盈余的薪酬权重，避免经理人短视，降低代理成本。有经理人参与的薪酬委员会降低了薪酬委员会薪酬契约设计的有效性，非政府控制的上市公司经理人不兼任薪酬委员会委员情形下的薪酬委员会更加有效，未发现薪酬与审计委员会董事分离度会增强经理人薪酬-绩效敏感度。
Using a sample of 2010-2011 domestic A-share listed companies, with the weighted least square analysis approach, this paper conduct an empirical analysis and shows that the proportion of independent directors in RC as well as a high degree of inte- gration of RC structure which is aligned with shareholder interests can improve executive compensation contract design and enhance pay-performance sensitivity, but also can adjust the degree of current earnings information on remuneration＇s weight based on the changing of company value to avoid short-sighted manager＇ s behavior and reduce agency costs. Managers who are involved in the RC, also enhance shareholders＇ and managers＇ wealth association, but it reduces the effectiveness of RC on executive compensation con- tract design. Non-government-controlled listed company and those managers who do not serve as members of the RC show more ef- fectively. This article does not find the RC and Audit Committee Directors separation will increase executive compensation-perfor- mance sensitivity.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第10期113-124,共12页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
吉林省科技厅项目2011(507)
吉林大学种子基金项目(2011ZZ036)
关键词
会计盈余时效性
薪酬委员会独立性
独立董事声誉
薪酬与审计委员会董事分离度
薪酬-绩效敏感度
accounting earnings timeliness
remuneration committee independence
independent director reputation
remunera-tion and audit committee separation degree
pay-performance sensitivity
