摘要
证券市场中上市公司的业绩操纵行为与证监部门的市场监管之间构成一个动态博弈与均衡问题。本文从经济学的角度分析探讨业绩操纵行为在我国证券市场普遍存在的原因、危害，并提出抑制业绩操纵行为、提高市场监管有效性的对策与建议。
There are signalling games between the rigging performance behaviour of public corporations and control commission in the stock market. The thesis analyses the cause and harm of rigging behaviour in the stock market in economics, and puts forward the proposals of controlling them and improving the effective of control.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
2000年第6期60-62,共3页
Nankai Business Review
