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银行危机处置过程中的股东权利限制研究 被引量:7

The Limitation of Stockholder's Right in the Crisis Intervention of Bank
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摘要 银行危机处置过程中股东权利限制是危机时期社会规制的需要,规制的原因包括维护金融稳定、预防系统性风险的发生、维护存款者的市场信心和预防股东道德风险发生。但股东权利保护是现代企业制度的核心内容,这就在"限制"与"保护"之间形成矛盾,这是银行生存的不同时期,股东行使权利正当性基础的差别造成的。因此,分析银行运行不同时期股东权行使的正当性基础,是论证银行危机处置期股东权利限制必要性的基础,同时,股东权利的限制必然影响到公司治理中利益相关主体间的权利结构平衡,故从法律规制和银行公司治理结构调整两个方面对"矛盾"的协调提出完善的建议。 Limitation of stockholder's right is the need for social regulation during the crisis intervention of bank in the crisis period. The reasons for regulation, including the maintenance of financial stability, to prevent the occurrence of sys- temic risk maintain the market confidence of depositors and prevention shareholder moral hazard. However the protection of shareholders' rights is the core of the modern enterprise system, and it will make the contradiction between limitation and protection, the reason is that the difference of legitimacy fundamental of shareholder exercise right in different period of banking operation. Therefore, analysis of the legitimacy concerning the shareholders' exercising their right in different peri- od of banking operation can provide proof for the limitation of stockholder' s fight. And it will affect fights' balance in cor- porate governance. Accordingly, some proposals are put forward including legal regulation and structural adjustment con- cerning the corporate governance of bank.
作者 杨松 郭金良
机构地区 辽宁大学法学院
出处 《法律科学(西北政法大学学报)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第5期120-129,共10页 Science of Law:Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(11YJA820099) 教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(NCET-11-1010)
关键词 银行危机处置 股东权利限制 金融稳定 银行公司治理 crisis intervention of bank limitation of stockholder's right financial stability corporate governance of bank
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