摘要
在单周期易逝品供应链协调问题的研究中,常常借助于经典的报童模型,限制销售商的订货机会只有一次。然而在实际中,对一些具有特定消费时间的易逝性商品(如中秋节月饼等),生产厂家为了更好地安排生产,通常提供提前购买价格折扣策略,销售商则在销售期末进行再次订购。以单个风险中性的供应商与多个竞争的损失规避型零售商组成的两阶段供应链系统为背景,在提前订购折扣(Advanced Booking Discount,ABD)合约中考察竞争和零售商的损失规避偏好对零售商的最优订购决策以及整个供应链协调性的影响。以博弈论为基本研究方法,证明了该供应链博弈存在惟一的对称纯策略Nash均衡,而且竞争使得零售商的总订购量上升,而损失规避则使得总订购量下降,供应商通过制定提前订购折扣合约可以协调整个供应链。最后通过算例,验证了提前订购折扣合约在协调供应链中的有效性。
The classical newsvendor model （CNM） is often used to study the supply chain coordinating problem with perishable prod- ucts in single period, and only one order is permitted in the CNM, which is inappropriate in fact. However, for some perishable prod- ucts with the special consumed time, such as the moon - cake for Middle - Autumn Festival, etc. , the manufacture for these items pro- vide a price discount for advanced booking in order to reduce inventory level. This paper considered a two - stage supply chain com- posed of a risk - neutral supplier and multiple competing loss - averse retailers, and investigated the combined impact of the competi- tion and retailer＇ s loss aversion attitude on the decision - making behavior of retailer and the coordination of supply chain within the advanced - booking discount contract. Based on game theory, it shows that in this supply chain game, there exists a unique symmetric pure Nash equilibrium, and the optimal total order quantity increases as the degree of competition increases but decreases as the loss a- version increases. Moreover it is found that, advance -booking discount contract can coordinate the supply chain. At last, the effec- tiveness of advanced - booking discount Contract is verified in supply chain by a case study.
出处
《控制工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第5期938-942,共5页
Control Engineering of China
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70661001
11161008)
贵州省自然科学基金项目(黔科合[2011]2102)
关键词
损失规避
提前订购折扣
供应链
易逝品
超模博弈
loss- averse
advanced- booking discount （ABD）
supply chain
perishable product
supermodular game
