摘要
经理自主权是影响企业研发投资的关键内在因素:一定程度的自主权能激发经理人的创新潜能,而较高自主权则容易出现过度研发投资的决策。本文研究发现,经理职位自主权和运作自主权会对企业的研发投资产生显著的正向影响,在考虑产权性质后,非国有公司中该影响并不显著。这表明非国有公司中经理的研发自主权受到了某种程度的抑制,而在国有公司中应避免经理利用自主权进行过度研发投资。
Managerial discretion is the key internal factors of enterprise R&D investment intensity. Certain extent of managerial discretion can stimulate managers' innovation potential,but too much managerial discretion can cause excessive development investment decision.This paper finds that managerial position discretion and operation discretion have a significant positive impact on R&D in- vestment intensity of the firm.But the effect doesn't appear in non state-owned companies consider- ing of the nature of property rights.This shows that managers' R&D discretion was inhibited to some extent in non state-owned companies,and excessive R&D investment should be avoided in state-owned companies by managers using managerial discretion.
出处
《中南财经政法大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期123-129,160,共7页
Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
