摘要
针对保障性住房申请过程中出现的不诚信申请问题,建立了审核部门与申请者之间的演化博弈模型,进而分析了两者的复制动态和演化博弈稳定策略,以及演化博弈系统的稳定性。结果表明,当申请者进行不诚信申请的收益大于不诚信申请的成本、政府部门对审核部门的奖罚力度不够且严格审核的成本过高时,不诚信申请必然出现。要确保不诚信申请的概率降低,就必须对保障性住房严格管理,对不诚信申请者进行严惩,在控制其预期收益的基础上提高成本,同时要加大对审核部门的监管及奖罚力度,加强审核队伍的建设。
For the problem of discredit in the application progress of security housing,this essay builds an evolutionary game model between the audit department and the applicant,and analyzes the replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy of both groups.The result shows that when the profit for discredit applicants is more than the cost;the cost of strictly audit is too high and governments’reward and punishment effort to the audit department is not enough,the discredit application is inevitable.To insure the probability of discredit application reduced,we must strictly manage the security housing;severely punish the discredit applicants;increase the cost on the basis of controlling the prospective earnings;and at the same time,strengthen the supervision,reward and punishment effort to the audit department;strengthen the construction of audit team.
出处
《城市问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第8期78-82,共5页
Urban Problems
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71203241)
关键词
保障性住房
不诚信申请
演化博弈
复制动态方程
演化稳定策略
security housing
discredit application
evolution game
replication dynamic equation
evolutionary stable strategy
