摘要
供应链中的信息对于供应链参与者的利益和供应链的绩效是有价值的。建立了一个供应商两个零售商的基本模型,就供应商是否泄漏零售商订单信息展开,给出了伯川德竞争环境下,不同均衡的产品定价策略。
Information is valuable for the participants' interests and supply chain performance. A basic model includes one supplier and two retailers is established, which takes the supplier's choice of information leakage as the prerequisite. Dif- ferent balanced pricing strategies of products are given under the situation of Bertrand Competition.
出处
《四川理工学院学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
2013年第4期80-83,共4页
Journal of Sichuan University of Science & Engineering(Natural Science Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(10CGL013)
关键词
信息泄露
定价
博弈论
供应链
information leakage
pricing
Game Theory
supply chain