摘要
系统的可靠性取决于最脆弱的"短板",如果系统在人为蓄意破坏情境下的损失最小,那么系统将具有更强的可靠性。基于这一思想,本文构建了以系统规划者为领导者,蓄意破坏者为从属者的应急资源防护双层规划模型。模型旨在鉴别突发事件下应急系统的薄弱环节,并对其实施防护。传统模型在处理这类问题时都是给定先验主观概率,但是由于主观概率具有随意性,所以并不十分妥当。本文的蓄意破坏模型从蓄意破坏者和公共部门交互决策出发,通过构建不对称博弈模型并利用数值算法来予以实现。数值试验证明,考虑最坏情境下的应急设施规划,能有效增强系统的可靠性和鲁棒性。这种思想和方法不仅对于应急设施防护问题有效,而且对于工程项目可靠性设计等问题也有一定的决策参考价值。
Reliability of the system depends on the short board. If the system manages to minimize losses from deliberate destruction, the system will have the greater reliability. Based on this idea, a bi-level programming model which includes the leader level and the follower level is established. This model can choose the modules which need defense against deliberate destroyers. Different from the previous model which uses priori probability, the game model contains two decision-makers： the public and the destroyer, and then the feasibility of the model and the algorithm can be proved through using the numerical experiments.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第6期123-130,共8页
Management Review
基金
中央专项第三批项目(CSY11007)
国家自然科学基金项目(71171150/G010301)
北京市优秀人才培养项目(2012D005022000013)
关键词
双层规划模型
蓄意破坏
系统可靠性
bi-level programming, deliberate destruction, reliability of the system
