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A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining 被引量:1

A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining
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摘要 In this paper we consider infinite horizon multilateral bargaining with al- ternate offers. We prove that there exists only one stationary subgame perfect equilib- rium outcome and it corresponds to the unique invariant measure of a column stochas- tic matrix. We characterize this stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in a closed form, and also extend the approach to the multilateral bargaining with random moves. In this paper we consider infinite horizon multilateral bargaining with al- ternate offers. We prove that there exists only one stationary subgame perfect equilib- rium outcome and it corresponds to the unique invariant measure of a column stochas- tic matrix. We characterize this stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in a closed form, and also extend the approach to the multilateral bargaining with random moves.
出处 《Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities》 2013年第2期272-287,共16页 中国高等学校学术文摘·经济学(英文版)
关键词 multilateral bargaining heterogeneous discount factors stationary SPE multilateral bargaining, heterogeneous discount factors, stationary SPE
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