摘要
学界通说将"对赌协议"归为射幸合同不仅是合同法理论上的误读,也是对当事方交易的曲解。作为非典型合同,是否违背法律法规的禁止性规定和社会公共利益是判断特定协议效力的依据,其中社会公共利益具体化为债权人利益、证券市场公众投资者利益。"对赌协议"在我国的异化侵蚀了新兴的风险投资市场秩序。对此,司法裁判应当从风险投资家的尽职调查切入,可以通过诚实信用原则发挥司法裁判在金融创新中的引导和建构功能。
Theoretically, it is a misunderstanding of the contract law to categorize ＂valuation adjust-ment mechanism＂（VAM） as an aleatory contract; in practice, this is also a misunderstanding of the nature of the transaction between the parties involved. As an atypical type of contract, VAM should be judged by whether it is against what the law prohibits or jeopardizes the public interests （ specified as the interests of creditors and public investors in the securities market）. The alienation of VAM in Chi- na has disturbed the order of the emerging venture capital market. The key to solving this problem lies in enhancing the guiding and constructive role played the judicial judgments through keeping under strict scrutiny the venture capitalists＇ duty fulfillment and observing the principle of honesty and the spirit of fair play.
出处
《南京师大学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期94-100,共7页
Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Social Science Edition)
基金
中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2012M521309)的部分研究成果
关键词
金融创新
司法裁判
对赌协议
射幸合同
judicial judgment
valuation adjustment mechanism
aleatory contract
