摘要
作为东北亚重要的国际性河流,图们江实现国际通航,对图们江地区国际合作开发具有重要意义。在梳理图们江国际通航的理论依据基础上,运用转化博弈思维与方法,建立博弈模型,对图们江国际通航合作中的问题与出路进行了探讨。结果表明:①图们江国际通航受阻是俄朝寻求相对利益最大化的理性反应,而俄朝之所以采取非合作策略,其深层根源是地缘政治优先与战略均衡思维及其之上的多维利益考量,以及法理性制约;②在图们江通航问题上的非合作博弈的现实,最终导致了中俄朝3个沿岸国的绝对收益最差、群体收益也最小,陷入与社会期望完全相悖的社会两难境地。③结成合作大联盟是图们江通航博弈的帕累托最优,这必将为联盟群体带来最大化效率,其成员的效率也是最大的;④联盟结构与联盟成员的目标取向与实现路径正好相反,而个体收益水平与合作策略的选择之间也非简单线性相关,这就导致大联盟结构必然是非稳定的;⑤由于缺乏结成大联盟的内生动力与自我强化机制,必须借助外部强制力,诸如具有强制约束力的法律和转移支付手段等,建立起合作博弈的社会机制体系,才能确保其稳定性。
As an important international river of the Northeast Asia, the Tumen River directly adjoins with three countries China, Russia, and Korea by the channel. In the east, it is close to Japan and South Korea across the sea, and to the west of it can be migrated to attract Mongolia through the land bridge. It has a signification of the Tumen River cooperative development that the Tumen River to come true international navigation. Based on the Tumen River international navigation theoretical basis, which illustrated the realization of the Tumen River international navigation basis, historical basis, and legal basis, this paper established a basis of the Tu- men River international navigation game theory model and the cooperative game alliance structure. Through the reasonable hypothesis and simplification science, this article will deal with it quantitative qualitative problems, and try to discuss and slove the problems of the Tureen River international navigation, using the transformation game view and methods. The results show that： 1） It is the rational reaction of the most profitable trail to take between Russia and Korea, why is the Tumen River cannot navigate to the sea. The deep root that Russia and Korea take ＂no-cooperation＂ strategy is multidimensional interest considerations through geopolitical priority and strategic equilibrium, mainly including dae impact of geopolitical relations, multidimensional distribution pattern of the rights and interests, regional international cooperation level of restriction, the regulation of international law, the constraints of resources and environment, and so on multiple factors. 2） the Tumen River navigation obstruction is the results of non-cooperative game strategy adopted by Russia and Korea. However, the situation of non-cooperative is not accord with the social expectation of common development, mutual reciprocity and mutual benefit to China, Russia, and Korea, and it does not comply with a long-term traditional national relationship what the three countries pursuit of ＂friendly cooperation and coordination＂ with solemn promise, also does not assort with the international cooperation function of the Tumen River area＇ s development and opening up. What＇ s more, it deviates from the usual practice and trend of full development and utilization in the international rivers. 3） Russia, China, and Korea should form a grand coalition to work for the Pareto optimum of the Tumen River international navigation in conflicts around nations. This will bring for not only grand coalition but also its members to maximize efficiency. 4） Goal orientation of the grand coalition structure and its member is exactly opposite to the realization route, and the choice between individual income level and cooperation strategy is not simple linear correlation. So the grand coalition structure is inevitable instable. 5） Due to the lack of endogenous power and self strengthening mechanism about grand coalition, it is important to have the aid of external coercive power such as forced binding law and transfer payment methods, and set up cooperative game social mechanism system in order to ensure its stability. As a response, a coopera- tive game mechanism of social system should be designed, which is composed of friendly understanding mechanism, the side payment mechanism, institutional mechanism, diplomatic negotiation mechanism, and the internationalization of mechanism.
出处
《地理科学》
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第4期393-401,共9页
Scientia Geographica Sinica
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(41071100
41261044)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(11ssxt126)
云南师范大学人文社科研究基地项目资助
关键词
图们江
国际通航
博弈
大联盟
机制体系
the Tumen River
international navigation
game theory
grand coalition
mechanism system
