摘要
文章从理论上论证了产品质量信息不对称下的最优出口退税政策。由于产品质量信息不对称性所导致的"逆向选择"问题,优质产品的供给得不到足够的激励。因此,发展中国家的政府可以通过企业的出口绩效来甄别企业的类型,并利用出口退税政策对企业进行奖励和惩罚,从而有效揭示企业的成本类型。理论分析的主要结论如下:(1)最优出口退税政策应该因行业和产品而异,对于高新技术行业和高品质产品,应该加强出口退税力度,而对于低技术行业和低品质产品,应该对其出口征税;(2)在执行出口退税政策时,还应考虑出口目的地的收入水平,收入水平越高,则出口退税的门槛值越高。
This paper confirms the optimal export tax rebate policy un- der asymmetric information of product quality from the theoretical angle, namely owing to adverse selection the supply of high-quality products lacks enough incentives. Thus governments in developing countries can distin- guish high-quality and low-quality firms according to their export perform- ance, and employ export tax rebate policy to reward or punish firms, there- by effectively revealing corporate cost types. The main conclusions of the theoretical analysis are as follows, firstly, the optimal export tax rebate pol- icy varies with the industry and the product~ as for high-tech industry and high-quality products, the degree of export tax rebates should be strength- ened, and we should levy export tax on low-teeh industry and low-quality produets; secondly, the implementation of export tax rebates should take the income level of the export destination into account; higher income level gives rise to higher threshold of tax rebates.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第5期29-40,共12页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
南开大学基本科研业务费专项资金项目(NKZXB1140)资助
关键词
出口退税
信息不对称
激励相容
export tax rebate
asymmetric information
incentive com-patibility
