摘要
为改善煤矿安全管理状况,从制度相关人角度分析煤矿安全管理制度的有效执行。采用不完全信息动态博弈模型,分析给定后验信念的贝叶斯均衡和分离的均衡策略,研究煤矿工人、煤矿管理者在不同状况下是否选择执行安全管理制度。结果表明,在高于自身临界成本的条件下,煤矿工人不会自觉遵守安全管理制度,超出临界成本则会产生侥幸心理。在制度认知影响薪酬的条件下,工人会不断提高自身素质和认知水平。只有当安全生产带来的收益高于不安全生产的收益时,煤矿管理者才会主动遵守制度,鼓励煤矿工人进行安全生产。因此,煤矿管理者重视、激励安全生产,提高工人素质、认知,政府和社会对煤矿企业监督、扶持,都是提高煤矿安全制度有效性的重要方式。
Effectiveness of coal mine safety regulations was analyzed from the aspects of the institutional relevant parties. The results show that coal miners may not comply with safety management regulations and may produce fluke mind if their critical cost is exceeded, that if regulation cognition of coal miners affects their salary, they can improve their quality and cognition, and that only when the profits of safety production are higher than that of unsafe production, do coal mine managers order miners to comply with safety regulations positively. Attention and motivation of managers, improvement of coalminers＇ quality and cognition, supervision and support of the government and society, are important approaches to improving effectiveness of the regulations.
出处
《中国安全科学学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第2期15-19,共5页
China Safety Science Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金资助(70671101
71173217)
教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助(10YJA630010
11YJ630162)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(2012LWA04)
关键词
煤矿安全管理
制度有效性
不完全信息动态博弈
完全主体贡献性
临界成本
coal mine safety
effects of regulations
game model of incomplete information
all stakeholders＇ contribution
critical cost
