摘要
自股权激励办法施行以来,股权激励作为一种降低代理成本的激励方式,被越来越多的上市公司所采用。然而实证发现,盈余管理会伴随股权激励发生,实行股权激励公司在业绩考核第一年存在显著的盈余管理现象,而业绩考核前一年并不存在。在影响盈余管理的因素上,公司选用考核范围更广的业绩指标能减少管理层进行盈余管理的动机,行权时长的增加会给管理层盈余管理造成一些困难,从而抑制管理层在后阶段盈余管理的行为。
Since the Listed Company Stockholder＇s rights policing method was issued, stock incentives have been gradually im- plemented by more and more listed companies to reduce agency costs. However, this paper finds out that the earnings manage- ment follows the Stock incentives. During the first performance evaluation year, the earnings managements are positively relat- ed to share options. And this relationship is statistically insignificant before the performance evaluation period with the same companies. In terms of the influential factors, the earnings managements are negatively related to the adoptions of various earn- ing indexes. Besides, the long exercise period makes the earnings management becoming difficult, which especially restrains the earnings management in the later phase.
出处
《河北工业科技》
CAS
2013年第2期92-96,共5页
Hebei Journal of Industrial Science and Technology
关键词
股权激励
盈余管理
代理理论
公司治理
stock incentives
earnings management
agency theory
corporate governance
