摘要
供应商和批发商避开产品产地批发市场直接交易时,双方缺乏对产品质量有效检测的道德风险增加了产品质量安全风险。本文先后考察并给出了以盈利为目标和不以盈利为目标两种情形下的产地批发市场道德风险协调策略及其适用范围。研究表明,在批发市场以盈利为目标时,若供应商和批发商的直接交易成本较小,批发市场的协调策略将失效;在批发市场不以盈利为目标时,其协调策略始终有效,但经营可能会亏损。在此基础上,提出了政府可行的管理建议。
Quality safety risk of products rises owing to the moral hazard from lack of certification when suppliers and wholesalers trade with each other directly avoiding wholesale market in the producing base.The moral hazard coordination policies and their application scopes in conditions when the wholesale market aims at profit or not are investigated and given successively. The results indicate that when aiming at profit, its coordination policy would fail if the ditect trading cost of suppliers and wholesalers are little enough~ when not aiming at profi,its coordination policy would always work though the operation may be of deficit.On this basis, the feasible government management recommendations are put forward.
出处
《中国流通经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期96-100,共5页
China Business and Market
关键词
农产品
产地批发市场
道德风险
协调策略
agricultural product
wholesale market in the producing base
moral hazard
coordination strategy
