摘要
科学的客观性长期以来由理论对于实在的静态符合得以保证,从逻辑经验主义到库恩的范式,再到社会建构论,都没有走出"语义上行"的困境,使客观性成了无根之木。伊恩·哈金通过对科学史的分析,认为科学的客观性在于发展成熟的推理风格,在于历史塑造而成的行为规则。但哈金的推理风格想在科学实践中最终排除社会因素,这种片面性源于其缺少辩证法的哲学基础。
For a long time,scientific objectivity is ensured by the static correspondence between theory and reality. From logical empiricism to Kuhn＇ s paradigm, and then to social constructivism,it never really rises above the so - called ＂semantic ascent＂ di- lemma,leaving objectivity a rootless entity. Based on his analysis of science history, Ian Hacking thinks that scientific objectivity lies in the well -developed reasoning styles, and in the action rules formed in our history modeling. However, Hacking＇ s one - sided wishes to exclude social factors in scientific practice can be attributed to the absence of dialectics philosophical foundation.
出处
《南京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2013年第2期67-73,共7页
Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology：Social Sciences
基金
南京大学"985工程"学科建设项目研究成果之一
关键词
伊恩·哈金
客观性
科学哲学
Ian Hacking
objectivity
history
reasoning styles
