摘要
本文通过理论模型推导以及运用面板GLS对中国货币政策传导的银行贷款渠道理论进行了检验,并验证了银行治理在货币政策传导的银行贷款渠道中的作用。结论显示,董事会规模和独立性对贷款规模影响较小;第一大股东性质和上市特征对贷款规模和货币政策敏感度产生显著影响;股东与股东大会、高管层以及监事会三方面的治理水平差异是导致不同银行贷款行为对货币政策反应不同的主要原因。
This paper examines the bank lending channel of monetary policy and the important role that bank governance plays in this transmission mechanism by using theoretical model and empirical research. We use da- ta from 2003 to 2010 in China＇s commercial banks and FGLS model to conduct the empirical research and show that, in China＇s commercial banks, boards of directors and independence have little effect on bank lending be- havior, while the identity of largest shareholder and whether the bank is listed affect the bank＇s lending scale and sensitivity to monetary policy. The differences of governance of shareholder and shareholder＇s general meet- ing, senior management and board of supervisors are the major causes of banks＇ difference in lending when mo- netary policy changes.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期107-121,共15页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家社科基金重大招标项目(12&ZD069)
国家自然科学基金项目(71272119)
教育部人文社科基金项目(12YJA790005)的资助
关键词
货币政策
贷款渠道
银行治理
Monetary policy, Lending channel, Bank governance
