摘要
本文把博弈论应用于企业管理 ,利用博弈论的委托 -代理理论构造了一个委托 -代理激励模型 ,针对信息对称与信息不对称情况进行了分析。在设计企业的委托代理机制时 ,若考虑了对经理的激励 ,则委托人的风险成本、代理成本都比没有考虑对经理的激励时要小。从理论上证明了对企业经理激励的必要性。
Game theory is applicated on industrial management in this paper ,a principal-agent incentive model is set up. Analyses symmetric information and asymmetric information.As a principal-agent mechanism is desiged,if incentive for manager in a enterprise is considered then risk costs、agential costs of principal are smaller than incentive for manager in a enterprise if not considered.The article has proved in theory that incentive for manager in a enterprise is necessary and provided a theory basis for annual salary system of enterpriser.
出处
《数理统计与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2000年第4期25-28,共4页
Journal of Applied Statistics and Management
