摘要
本文基于两国减排博弈拓展了Weber和Neuhoff(2010)的一国环境经济模型,进而探讨了非合作和合作两种情形下,具有不同技术创新水平时各国最优碳税的变化及其对社会福利的影响。结论表明,技术创新削弱了碳税之于减排的重要性,同时增强了国际合作减排的动力,而技术差距越大,合作意愿越小。当两国减排责任接近或者存在合作补偿的情况下,容易形成福利增进、达成减排合作。这为我国进一步加快低碳技术创新、充实南南减排合作,从而更好地应对气候变化谈判提供了理论依据和决策参考。
In the face of global warming, the difficult international coopera- tion and unilateral carbon tax in developed countries formed a sharp contrast. In this paper, one-country model （Weber and Neuhoff, 2010） is evolved to be two-country model based on the emission abatement game between the two coun- tries. We use this model to discuss domestic optimal carbon tax and its impact on social welfare in the two cases of non-cooperation and cooperation with differ- ent levels of technological innovation. The conclusion is that, technological inno- vation may weaken the importance of carbon tax in reducing emissions, while en- hancing the impetus of international cooperation in reducing emissions. The great- er the technology gap, the smaller the willingness to cooperate. If the responsibili- ty of one country for emissions reductions is close to the other, or one country may compensate to the other, it is easy to form welfare promotion to reach emis- sion abatement cooperation. This paper provides a theoretical basis for China to further accelerate low carbon technology innovation and enrich the cooperation of the South-South abatement, so that we can better respond to the climate change negotiations.
出处
《国际贸易问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期81-91,共11页
Journal of International Trade
基金
国家社科基金重大项目(10zd&017)
国家社科基金青年项目(11CJY037)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(105561GK)
全国统计科学研究计划项目重点项目(2011LZ001)
北京师范大学2012年度文科跨学科沙龙"人格心理的可计算模型与个体经济决策"
关键词
二氧化碳减排
技术创新
碳税
国际合作
Carbon dioxide emission abatement
Technological innovation
Carbon tax
International cooperation
