摘要
本文利用1994—2008年我国18个省241个城市书记和市长与城市的匹配数据,分析了地方官员对地方经济增长的贡献。地方官员在城市间的调动使得官员个人对经济增长贡献的比较从一个城市之内扩展到了不同城市之间。经验证据表明,地方官员的个人效应具有整体显著性,即不同的地方官员对经济增长的作用存在显著差异,且内生性样本构成、内生性调动以及城市层面的扰动并不影响这一结论。就个人效应对官员晋升的影响的分析表明,尽管官员的年龄是一个重要的因素,但个人效应也十分重要,且其重要性随着官员年龄的增长而加强;个人效应对市长的晋升具有显著作用,对书记的晋升没有显著作用,而官员在职期间城市的经济增长速度对晋升没有显著作用。
This paper studies the role of subnational leaders in economic growth using city-leader pair data collected from 241 cities in China＇ s 18 provinces for the period 1994--2008. A unique feature of China＇ s institutional arrangements is that local leaders are often moved from one city to another. This allows us to compare leaders across cities. We find that leaders matter for local economic growth. Further exploration shows that our sample does not suffer from biased attrition and our estimates of the leader effects are robust to transitory shocks and are not affected by nonrandom moves of leaders. Using the leaders＇ personal effects estimated from our test, we find that more capable leaders are more likely to get promoted although their chances are nuanced by their ages. We also find that local economic growth is not a good predictor for promotion after leaders＇ personal effects are controlled.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期137-150,共14页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家社会科学基金重点研究项目(项目编号09&ZD020)的支持
关键词
地方官员
经济增长
晋升锦标赛
Local Leaders
Economic Performance
Promotion Tournament
