摘要
食品安全治理实质上是人们履行产品质量合约问题,而合约是在既定制度环境下基于资产专用性和交易属性理性选择的结果。在社会转型期,制度环境和技术的不确性诱发的厂商机会主义是食品安全治理失效的根源,它加深了市场主体的负向调整并过度依赖市场和企业合约,而混合治理合约未受重视,也诱使企业偏向以通用资产替代专用资产,直接降低了安全水平。因此,创设稳健制度环境并激励缔结多元混合合约是扭转私人治理低效的基本政策取向。
The essence of the food security governance is problem of performing product quality contract between the people. And the contract is the result of asset specificity and rational transaction choice in the system environment. In the period of social transition, the institutional environment and technological uncertainty induces manufacturer opportunism which is the failure of food safety governance and deepens the negative adjustment of the market entities and excessive dependence on the market and enterprise contract. While the hybrid governance contracts have not been paid enough attention to, which induces the deviation to the substitution special assets of general asset and the safety level directly reduces. Therefore, to create the sound institutional environment and encourage a mixed contract is the basic policy orientation to reverse the private governance inefficient.
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期133-141,共9页
Reform
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“基于成本视角的食品安全规制效果评价及其优化研究”(批准号:71173136)、“基于技术扩散的农产品质量安全控制研究”(批准号:70873075)
山东省自然科学基金项目“基于可持续发展的山东蔬菜产业竞争力动态仿真与评价研究”(批准号:ZR2010GQOOP)
教育部人文社会科学项目“基于可持续发展的蔬菜产业竞争力动态仿真与评价研究--以山东蔬菜产业为例”(批准号:11YJCZH261)
关键词
食品安全
制度环境
交易成本
社会管理
food security, institutional environment, transaction cost, social management
