摘要
自从股权分置改革以来,我国资本市场上股权再融资方式发生了巨大变化,尤以定向增发的大幅增加最为明显。为何定向增发突然成为上市公司备受青睐的再融资方式,这种融资方式对于大股东来说是否具有私利可图,是否会侵害中小股东的权益,基于此文章选取2006-2008年有大股东参与的定向增发公司为样本,研究了定向增发折价与大股东参与下利益输送的关系,发现在大股东参与定向增发的情况下,大股东认购的比例越大,定向增发的折价水平越高,大股东的利益输送越明显。
Since the reform of non-tradable shares, the stock refinancing pattern in Chinese capital mar- ket has undergone great changes, including the lager increase of the private placement. This paper aim at exploring the reasons that the private placement suddenly becomes the favorable refinancing method of listed companies, and finding out whether this method of financing will gain benefits for large shareholders and whether it will infringe the rights and interests of small shareholders. Based on the data of the companies conducting the large shareholders involved private placement in 2006--2008, the paper studies the relationship between the discount of private placement and the tunneling with the participation of large shareholders. It is found that under the circumstances of the participation of large shareholders in private placement, the bigger the subscription proportion of large shareholders, the higher the discount level of private placement and more obvious the tunneling of large shareholders.
出处
《合肥工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2013年第1期19-24,共6页
Journal of Hefei University of Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词
大股东
定向增发
折价率
利益输送
large shareholder
private placement
discount rate
tunneling
