管理层权力与信息披露质量关系的实证研究被引量：5

An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Managerial Power and Information Disclosure Quality

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摘要信息披露质量是投资者利益保护、维持资本市场健康发展的关键因素。文章根据2003-2009年深交所上市公司数据,考察了管理层权力与信息披露质量之间的关系。研究结果发现,管理层"正"向权力同信息披露质量呈负相关关系,管理层"负"向权力同信息披露质量呈正相关关系。因此,要解决信息披露失真问题,应该从合理安排管理层权力入手。 Information disclosure quality is the key factor of protecting investor＇s interests and maintaining the healthy development of the capital market.In the article the relationship between managerial power and information disclosure quality is investigated according to the data of the listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the period of from 2003 to 2009.The research discovers that the ＂positive＂ power of management is negatively related with information disclosure quality and the ＂negative＂ power is positively related with information disclosure quality.Therefore,the proper arrangement of managerial power is very important for solving the distortion problem of information disclosure.

作者徐良果王勇军汪丽

机构地区西藏大学财经学院

出处《西藏大学学报（社会科学版）》 CSSCI 2012年第6期182-189,共8页 Journal of Tibet University

基金 2012年度国家社会科学基金青年项目"管理层权力信息披露质量与投资效率的实证研究"(项目号:12CGL025) 2011年度西藏大学财经学院科研培育基金项目"管理层权力信息披露质量与投资效率关系的实证研究"(项目号:ZD-CYPY2011003)阶段性成果

关键词管理层权力信息披露质量关系研究 managerial power information disclosure quality relationship research

分类号 F272 [经济管理—企业管理]

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