摘要
黑格尔在《小逻辑》"逻辑学概念的初步规定"章节中,对康德以前的形而上学进行了批判,并对自己的逻辑学或形而上学做出了初步的规定。基于对此一章节的解读,本文通过对黑格尔批判旧形而上学的关键点——思想和思想的对象的关系的梳理,力图阐明黑格尔的逻辑学在何种意义上超越了康德以前的形而上学,并进而阐明黑格尔自己对形而上学的规定。
In the chapter of ＂the Initial Provisions of the Logic Concept＂ of his book Small Logic, Hegel criticized the metaphysics previous to Kant and made the preliminary provisions of his own logic or metaphysics. The paper, based on the interpretation of this chapter, combed the relationship between ideas and object of thought through Hegel＇s criticism of the old metaphysics and attempts to clarify in what sense of Hegel＇s logic goes beyond prior to Kant＇s metaphysics and further clarify Hegel ＇s own provisions to metaphysics.
出处
《衡阳师范学院学报》
2013年第1期22-25,共4页
Journal of Hengyang Normal University
关键词
旧形而上学
思想
思想的对象
规定性
思辨哲学
old metaphysics
thought
the object of thought
provision
speculative philosophy
