摘要
对某汽车电子厂车窗控制器生产线的现场调查表明:在该厂车窗控制器生产线的各个工序中,由于EOL检验仪器的检测时间较长,终检工序始终是整条生产线的瓶颈。本文将终检工序看作是单队、单台、工件成批到达、两个服务阶段的串联型排队系统。据此,采用活动循环图法建立相应的生产系统模型和仿真模型,并提出系统改进方案,通过比较完成N件产品检验的总时间、缓存量变化和EOL等待时间曲线、MC设备利用率以及EOL设备利用率等系统性能指标,对所提改善方案的仿真研究表明:改进后生产节拍约由改进前的10.4 s,提升到9.7 s;瓶颈设备EOL的利用率从88.6%提高到90.1%。
By using a principal and agent theory,a model of dynamic optimal incentive contract for managers is developed based on companies＇ future performance achieved by managers＇ long-term and short-term effort.Conditions for achieving effective reputation and ways to enhance incentive effect are presented.It is shown that incentive strategy and managerial effort have great impact on companies＇ future performance.The rationality and applicability of the model are illustrated by practical cases.
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2012年第6期1-7,共7页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
吉林省科技发展计划资助项目(201105018)
关键词
生产线
建模
仿真
principal and agent
incentive
dynamic incentive contract
