摘要
以2005年-2009年的上市公司为样本,研究了负债融资与两权分离之间的关系,研究结果表明:我国上市公司的负债融资能够抑制过度投资行为、降低公司代理人成本。由于该结论是基于财务杠杆作为唯一治理变量得出的,使其对于债务融资治理低效率的原因解释不够充分。今后应重视债权与股权治理的互动关系以及财务杠杆的内生性等问题的研究。
This paper selected the listed companies to study the relationship between debt financing and the separation of control rights and cash flow rights for the period of 2005-2009. The study shows that debt financing has a discipline role for over investment behavior in Chinese listed companie,4 and it can reduce corporate agency costs, too. But the conclusion cannot explicitly explain why the inefficient governance results with the single variable of financial leverage in existing models. Future research is expected to pay more attention to the relationship between governance of creditor＇s rights and that of shareholder＇s rights and leverage＇s structures.
出处
《山东纺织经济》
2012年第12期13-15,83,共4页
Shandong Textile Economy
关键词
债务治理
治理效率
控制权
governance of creditor＇s rights, governance efficiency, control rights
