控制权影响下的关联购销与上市公司价值——对限售股形成、禁售、解禁的三阶段分析被引量：5

The Impact of Control Rights on the Relationship between Related Party Purchases/Sales and Corporate Value ——An Empirical Analysis on the Three-stages of Restricted-Stock

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摘要关联购销常被看作控股股东追求控制权收益的重要方式。控股股东追求的控制权收益不同,对关联购销的处理措施也必然呈现差异化,从而对公司业绩产生不同影响。论文以沪市2003-2011年制造业上市公司为样本,在股权分置改革以及限售股不断解禁的大背景下,研究不同控制权收益驱动的异常关联购销与企业价值的关系。论文研究发现,股权分置改革前,控股股东倾向于追求控制权私利,异常关联购销与企业价值显著负相关;股权分置改革后限售股解禁前,两者虽然仍为负相关关系但已不显著;限售股解禁后控股股东更倾向于提升企业价值获得共享收益,异常关联购销与企业价值呈现正相关倾向,但统计上不显著。 Related party purchases/sales are often regarded as important ways for controlling shareholders to pursue control benefits. Controlling shareholders will match relative related party transactions to different control benefits, then, result in different level of corporate values. Given the reform of non -tradable shares and reduction of restricted -shares, this paper uses manu- facturing listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2011 as sample, analyzes the relationship between the abnormal related party purchases/sales and the corporate value driven by types of control benefits. We find that abnormal related party purchases/sales are sig- nificantly negatively related with corporate value due to private benefits of control before the re- form. After the reform but before the end of restriction period, the coefficient is still negative but not significant. After restriction period, controlling shareholders prefer shared benefits of control by improving corporate value, but we find no significantly positive relation between abnormal re- lated party purchases/sales and corporate value.

作者佟岩牛春立

机构地区北京理工大学管理与经济学院

出处《科学决策》 2012年第11期1-19,共19页 Scientific Decision Making

基金国家自然科学基金项目(70902012) 教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(09YJC790016 10YJC630370) 国家留学基金委国家公派访问学者项目(留金发[2010]3009号) 北京市优秀人才培养资助计划(2012D009011000005) 北京理工大学基础研究基金(20082142007 20092142003)

关键词控制权关联购销企业价值股权分置改革限售股 control rights related party purchases/sales corporate value the leform of non - tradable shares restricted - stock

分类号 F306 [经济管理—产业经济]

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