摘要
在承揽研发外包的过程中,如果新的研发路径出现,代理方会将此路径披露给第三方,而委托方为治理这类可能发生的披露行为,会在双方研发外包关系形成时配置最优的控制权。尽管控制权越大,代理方的披露行为越能够被有效地治理进而委托方的收益也越大,但越大的控制权所带来的成本也越大,故最优的控制权配置应该在权衡该收益和成本的基础上进行。而在此过程中,合同的不完全性表现得越明显,委托方所拥有的最优控制权就越大。另外,不同于Lerner和Malmendier的论断,委托方配置最优的控制权将占优于不配置任何控制权。而相关的经验性证据也验证了这类结论。
As a contractor in the process of R＆D outsourcing, the agent will disclose the new R＆D path to the third party if the new path emerges. In order to prevent the possible behavior of the agent, the principal will allocate the optimal control rights to himself at the beginning of R＆D outsourcing. The more the control rights are, the possible disclosing behavior will be more effectively prevented and the more benefits the principle will have, however, the more the control rights are, the more costs that the principal bear will be. As a result, the optimal control rights will be allocated based on the benefits and the costs. In the process of allocating control rights, the optimal control rights that the principal retains will become more as the contracts become more incomplete. Furthermore, different from the theoretical results of Lerner ＆ Malmendier（2010） , that the principal allocates optimal control rights will dominate that the principal does not allocate any control right. Empirical evidences do support these results.
出处
《科学学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第11期1715-1722,共8页
Studies in Science of Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71002051)
上海市软科学基金项目(007)
关键词
研发外包
控制权配置
合同的不完全性
R＆D outsourcing
the allocation of control rights
contractual incompleteness
