城市智慧化中公共服务供给方式的异动影响被引量：1

Changes of Public Service Provision during Urban Intelligent Development

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摘要新一代移动互联网、物联网、云计算等信息技术的广泛和深入的应用,不仅使得政府在城市管理和公共服务提供方面的效率大大提高,使得城市变得更为"智慧",而且也将改变政府在公共服务提供形式、渠道方面的选择,从而改变政府的边界。基于经济学中的不完全合同理论,分析政府在权衡是否选择将公共服务外包背后的经济学逻辑,以及信息技术的应用如何影响政府的边界,将有助于降低政府协调的成本。

作者蒋士成

机构地区华东理工大学商学院

出处《上海城市管理》 2012年第6期48-52,共5页 Shanghai Urban Management

基金国家自然科学基金项目"企业研发外包组织模式与控制权分配研究:基于创新的交易成本视角"(71002051) 华东理工大学探索研究基金项目"企业研发的最优组织模式研究:从市场到一体化"的资助

关键词公共服务外包政府的边界不完全合同智慧城市

分类号 D630 [政治法律—中外政治制度] F49 [经济管理—产业经济] F299.2 [经济管理—国民经济]

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