摘要
为了解政策实施的情况,官员经常需要到企业中进行视察。而官员视察企业的活动也越来越得到企业的重视,正成为建立政企关系的重要活动。那么,官员的视察活动是否会对企业资源配置产生影响呢?本文以2004-2007年上市公司中的制造行业为样本,实证分析了官员视察对企业绩效的影响。结果表明,官员视察活动对企业的绩效有显著的积极影响。与国有企业相比,官员视察对民营企业绩效影响更大,而且在制度环境越差的地区,官员视察对企业绩效影响更大。这有助于我们进一步理解官员活动对企业资源配置的影响。
During the transition period, government-enterprise relationship is an avoidable topic. On the one hand, government is an important part of the external environment for enterprises＇ sur- vival. The government controls many resources which determined the enterprises can only survive by keeping good relationship with government. On the other hand, the enterprises, through their eco- nomic strength, potentially influence governmental performances and long term development plan. An important channel for estab- lishing relationship between enterprises and government is official inspection. In order to know the implementation of government policies, government officials often need to carry out inspections or visits to firms. As a noticeable chance to build relationships with of- ficials, official inspection has attracted more and more attention of the firms. Using a sample of listed firms in manufacturing industry during 2004 and 2007, this paper empirically tested how official inspection to firms affects their performance. We find that, official inspection has a significant and positive effect on firm performance. Comparing to state-owned enterprises, official inspection is more important for the performance of private firms. Additionally, under poorer institutional environment, official inspection has a greater effect on firm performance. These results enable us to better under- stand how officials＇ activities can make an influence on resource allocation among firms. This paper has made the following contri- butions： Firstly, most existing references when describing political relationships take whether there are executives or board members of the company with government working experience as the measure. This method cannot effectively describe the change of companies＇ political relationships and its consequences. We argue in this paper that officials＇ inspection to enterprises is a good indicator and good opportunities for the enterprises to establish or develop their rela- tionship with the government. Secondly, our paper, taking ＂seem- ingly ordinary＂ officials inspection to enterprises as a start, finds that official＇s inspection to enterprises are really beneficial and influential to corporate performance. It t certifies, to some degree, that official activity can influence enterprises and even economic development. It is helpful for us to get a better understanding for why Chinese enterprises are keen for communicating with officials and why enterprises value official inspections so much.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期74-83,共10页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(70902024
71003108)资助
关键词
官员视察
企业绩效
政治关系
Official Inspection
Political Connections
Firm Per- formance.
