摘要
本文通过建立电力产业规制模型来探讨垄断的电力产业促进中国经济增长的具体机制。我们发现,相对于无规制的独家垄断状态,规制者通过降低垄断者的电价和利润来实现经济增长的目标,但是不完美监督则造成了"双赢互换型"规制失效和小工商业用户对耗电大户的交叉补贴,这构成了电网高收入的主要来源。经验证据进一步证明了本文提出的理论命题,最后,我们总结提出了中国的电力产业规制理论,并对现行的电力产业改革路径进行了反思。
A regulation model is set up to explore the mechanism by which the electricity industry accelerates economic growth. We find that the regulator lower the price and profit of the monopolist to realize economic growth compared to the mo- nopolist without regulation. However, imperfect supervision leads to ＂two-win exchange＂ regulation failure and cross-subsidy from small business to larger consumer, which comprises the source of high income in Grid. Empirical test further prove the theory we raise in this thesis. Finally, we summarize the theory on electricity industry in China and reconsider the path of the existing reformation path of the electricity industry.
出处
《产业经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期19-27,共9页
Industrial Economics Research
基金
国家自然科学基金国家自然科学基金课题"转轨经济条件下网络型产业竞争政策研究"(项目编号:70973066)资助
关键词
垄断
电力产业
规制失效
经济增长
monopoly
electricity industry
regulation failure
economic growth
