期刊文献+

行为管理制度的失效率治理设计的措施优化组合方法——以工程招投标制度为例 被引量:12

Measure combination optimization method in design for reducing void rate of behavior management institution—Projects tender institution as example
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摘要 工程招投标领域是行为管理制度失效的多发区,文章以招投标制度的设计为例,提出了一般性的行为管理制度失效率治理设计的措施优化组合技术,包括第一优化问题与第二优化问题的解决方法.与一般的思辨性研究相比,文章提出制度设计方法具有可计算性的优点,因此具有较强的科学性和工具性;与单纯的数学模型研究相比,文章提出的制度设计方法具有结构图化和表格化的特点,因此具有良好的可操作性.基于这两点,制度的失效率治理设计的措施优化组合技术具有广泛的适用性,便于推广,可以在各行业的制度创新与改革中产生实践效益. Projects tender institution has high void rate very often. Taking it as an example, this paper provides a measure combination optimization method in design for reducing void rate of institution (MCOM in DRVRI), which includes the first optimizing problem and the second optimizing problem. Contrasted with those speculation methods, the method provided here has the advantage of calculability. Contrasted with those mathematic model methods, the method is structurelized and formlized, which makes it more practical in use. So the method can be widely used in various institution design.
作者 孙绍荣
出处 《系统工程理论与实践》 EI CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2012年第10期2173-2185,共13页 Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金 国家自然科学基金(70871080 71171134) 上海市科研创新重点项目(11ZS138) 上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2011BGL006) 上海市重点学科项目(S30504)
关键词 制度 行为 招投标 措施 设计 institution behavior tender measure design
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参考文献32

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二级参考文献43

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