摘要
在工程项目招投标中,对投标人进行资格预审是通行做法。文中通过构造招标人和投标人的博弈模型,来探讨类似事件中局中人行为选择问题,研究博弈各方在资格预审中信息失真和传递效率,结论表明投标人选择"造假"取决于造假收益、造假成本和招标人审查的概率,当外界能有效监督和招投标各方偏好一致时,投标人的真实类型信息才能被有效传递。
Qualification auditing of bidders is a common method in civil engineering construction projects.The paper discusses on strategy choices among players in affairs and researches the distorted information and efficiency of transmitting.The results signify that the benefits,costs and the probability of auditing are essential for bidder to choose ＂Fake＂.The real classification information of bidders will be transmitted correctly just when external supervision is valid and the benefits of proprietors and bidders are identical.
出处
《煤炭工程》
北大核心
2012年第10期138-140,共3页
Coal Engineering
关键词
招投标
博弈
信息
idding
game
information
