摘要
本文分析了在纵向相关市场结构下的一体化企业价格压榨的激励,为科学认定价格压榨提供了一定的理论基础。我们提出上游市场结构决定了纵向一体化企业是否采用价格压榨来获取单一垄断利润。当上游为寡头市场时,纵向一体化企业有价格压榨激励。相反,当上游为垄断市场时,没有实行价格压榨的激励。此时一体化企业的价格压榨虽然抬高了市场价格,但仍不能给其带来最大利润。另外,虽然价格压榨被普遍认为具有反垄断性质,但我们的分析表明当上游为寡头市场时,价格压榨却能增加消费者福利。本文的分析为反垄断法中的价格压榨案例和纵向合并案例,尤其是网络行业案例提供了一定的执法理论性依据。
This paper seeks to analyze the effects of a price squeeze by a vertically firm and to examine equilibrium in markets when one of the upstream firms integrates one of the downstream firms. We show that an integrated monopolist has no incentives to employ such a strategy, but that an integrated duopolist does have such incentives. Monopolization does not give the maximum profits to the monopolist with increased market prices. Such a strategy employed by the integrated firms is anti-competitive in its nature, but it improves market efficiency when employed by the integrated duopolist.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第9期51-63,共13页
China Industrial Economics
基金
中央大学科研经费项目"反垄断法与经济理论"(批准号Research Grant
0382)
日本文部科学省科研费(批准号Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(C)
20604001)
关键词
纵向相关市场
价格压榨
上游市场结构
一体垄断激励
vertically related market
price squeeze
upstream market structure
incentives to monooolize
