摘要
从不完全契约理论角度,重点讨论物流安全信息披露在实现物流服务购买者对物流安全信任中的重要作用,通过建立社会、政府或第三方组织与企业之间的博弈模型,建立服务提供方与服务需求方的信息博弈模型寻找动态均衡路径。分析加强物流安全信息披露的必要性及优质物流服务企业主动披露安全信息愈多获利愈多,且愈得到市场信任,并提出政策建议以引导物流服务市场的良性循环发展。
From the perspective of the incomplete contract theory, we discussed emphalically the importance of safety information disclosure in creating customer confidence in purchasing logistics services and, through formulating a game model among the soceity, government and/or third party organizalions, and enterprises, established the model of dynamic equilibrium path for the game between service providers and service buyers. According to our analysis, quality service providers could benefit more if they proaetively disclose more safety information and could also be more trusted by the market.
出处
《物流技术》
北大核心
2012年第7期247-249,共3页
Logistics Technology
关键词
不完全契约
物流安全
信息披露
博弈
incomplete contract
logistics safety
information disclosure
game
