摘要
车险是我国最早开始市场化改革的险种。2001年开始的费率改革引发了车险市场的一系列竞争效应。通过构建不同的博弈模型进行分析,结果表明:追求保费收入最大化是保险公司陷入非理性竞争的根源;车险营销的"强代理"模式加剧了这种恶性竞争;在监管力量短期内难以增加的情况下,依然停留在对费率本身的监管不利于车险的市场化改革。
Auto insurance rate reform was launched the earliest in the insurance market. The reform, which was initiated in 2001 ,triggered a series of competitive effects. By constructing different game models, we can find that the source of irrational competition between insurance companies is the pursuit of premium revenue maximization. The ＂strong-agent＂ model in auto insurance marketing has exacerbated this vicious competition. Given that regulation cannot be strengthened in short term, it may undermine the market-oriented reform on the auto insurance if the focus of regulation remains targeted at the pricing rate itself.
出处
《保险研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期39-48,共10页
Insurance Studies
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(09YJC630075)
关键词
车险费率市场化
竞争效应
博弈分析
market-orientation in auto insurance rates
competition effects
game theory analysisr
