摘要
中国的财政分权改革主要发生在中央与省关系层面,省以下分权由地方政府参照"中央—省"的制度安排自行调整。对中国县级数进行据实证分析,结果表明:地方政府的"双重援助依赖"引起了省以下政府的过度集权;与县级政府相比,省级政府的权力和资源更容易被地方精英所觊觎,并产生更大的"横财效应"和"贪婪效应";资本等生产要素在省内的流动性比省际间要高,分权条件下县级政府为增长而竞争的激励更强;省直管县制度难以孕育县级经济发展动力,对根本解决县乡财政困难作用有限,借鉴"命令模式"建立省以下分权制度可能找到解决之道。
The reform of China＇s fiscal decentralization mainly occurred in the level of central and province,the decentralization under the province should be based on the local government＇s proper adjustment referring to the institution management of ＂central-province＂.This paper empirically tests the relationship of intergovernmental grant and intraregional fiscal decentralization.The results show that ＂doubling grant dependency＂ brings about over-centralization of intraregional government.The power and resource held by provincial politician are easily captured by regional elites,and boost the windfall effect and voracity effect.The movement of productive factor is higher in intra-region than that of inter-region,so the county government has stronger incentive to compete for growth.The arrangement of province directly controlling county can not deal with the fiscal embarrassment facing by county government,and to learn from the ＂mandate model＂ and establish a decentralized system below the provincial level may be the only solution.
出处
《青岛科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2012年第1期50-54,共5页
Journal of Qingdao University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
基金
国家社科基金项目(11BZZ047)
关键词
转移支付
政府间关系
财政分权
transfer payments
intergovernmental relations
fiscal decentralization
