摘要
"我思"是笛卡尔哲学的一个基本原则。笛卡尔总是毫不迟疑地宣称"我思"的确定性,但是,"我思"确定性的根据何在,始终是一个问题。最为直接的回答是,笛卡尔持有意识透明性的主张:我能够确定地知道我的心灵状态。通过梳理和辨析对意识透明性的诸种解释,可以看出笛卡尔"我思"的确定性并不依赖于意识的透明性。另外一种回答则可追溯至伯纳德.威廉姆斯(Bernard Williams)等所认为的"我思考"的作出即是其为真的条件的说法。文章将着重考察威廉姆斯将言语活动和思想活动进行类比的论证,并试图指出在这个类比论证中存在的错误和疏漏。结合笛卡尔对内含的意识(internalawareness)和反省的意识(reflective awareness)的论述,笔者将论证,"我思"知识的确定性是在思想的必然的自身关系中获得说明的。
Descartes never hesitates to claim that we can be certain of the ＂cogito＂. However, it needs an explanation of the certain of my thinking. There is a straight forward reply that Descartes implicitly maintain the transparency of namely, we can know our mental states certainly. I will examine the doctrine of transparency first in order to argue that this doctrine is not necessary to guarantee the certainty of Descartes＇ eogito. In the second part, I will explore the insightful claim that the ＂I think＂ proposition~ being made is the sufficient condition of its being true. Following Ayer, Bernard Williams proposed this claim and worked out an analogical argument. Nevertheless, two serious flaws in the analogy spoil his argumentation. In the third part, I will elucidate Descartes＇ views about internal and reflective awareness and conclude that the certainty of the cogito consists in the necessa- ry self - relation of thought.
出处
《兰州学刊》
CSSCI
2012年第3期20-24,共5页
关键词
笛卡尔
我思
内含的意识
反省的意识
Descartes
cogito
internal awareness
reflective awareness
