摘要
本文通过放松经理人市场的完全竞争性假定,拓展了经典职业生涯模型,藉此研究了中国制度背景下的机构持股、企业性质与企业创新的关系,并基于2004—2009年923家上市公司的数据,从R&D投入和专利申请两个维度对本文拓展模型的命题进行了实证检验。结果表明:(1)异质机构对企业创新有不同的影响,证券投资基金对企业创新有显著的负效应,这种负效应在国有企业中表现得更为明显;(2)民营企业中机构投资者持股促进了企业的创新活动,国有企业中机构投资者持股与企业创新呈显著的负相关关系;(3)机构投资者整体持股对全样本企业的专利申请有不显著的正效应,而对R&D投入则有显著的负效应。
By releasing the hypothesis of complete competition, the paper extends the Manager＇ s Career Concern Model, and on which it investigates the relationship between heterogeneous institutional investor, the nature of firm and innovation in China, followed by empirical tests based on data of 923 enterprises of Chinese listed companies from the year 2004 to 2009,with the innovation measured by R＆D input and patent application. The results show that ownership of investment fund is associated with less innovation in state-owned enterprises than in private companies, and QFII ownership put a positive effect on innovation in private companies rather than in stated-owned enterprises, while insurance fund ownership leads to more innovation in both two categories of enterprises. We also find that institutional ownership has a significant positive impact on innovation in private companies, but negative in state-owned enterprises. Further, institutional overall ownership has an insignificant positive impact on patent application, compared with a significant negative effect on R＆D input. Accordingly, the paper gives some adviees on how to improve innovative capacity of different type of Chinese listed companies.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期53-64,共12页
Economic Research Journal
基金
教育部人文社科规划项目(09yja790162)
西安交通大学"985工程二期"资助项目(批准号07200701)
西安交通大学重点学科建设项目资助阶段性成果
关键词
机构投资者
研发投入
专利申请
自主创新
Institutional Investor
R&D Input
Application of Patent
Independent Innovation
