摘要
最近几年中国的影子银行或信托融资业务快速发展,反映了利率市场化的实际表现,不过这些业务的潜在风险也引发了对中国经济增长硬着陆的担忧。向公众销售理财产品的信托融资和由金融机构作为中介的委托贷款两种融资方式具有较大的潜在风险。尽管个别违约可能会引发广泛的赎回,但中国的信托融资尚不致形成"资产价格下跌—不断恶化的资产负债表—被迫抛售资产"之间的恶性循环。中国的影子银行也还不会导致系统性金融风险,但完善影子银行业务的监管已经成为一项紧迫的任务。
The business of trust lending, or ' shadow banking ' , has been increasing rapidly in recent years, reflecting the ' bottom-up ' liberalization of interest rates. However, the potential risks involved in such lending have also led to concern about a hard-landing for the Chinese economy. The two types of off-balance-sheet lending — trust lending through trust companies selling wealth management products to the public and entrusted loans mediated by financial institutions — present greater risks. Like the US sub-prime debt, trust financing has not been adequately regulated. Moreover, it lacks transparency and depends on underlying asset prices, which have started a correction. Meanwhile, to attract investors, such trust products sometimes involve overly risky pricing behavior. However, unlike the sub-prime debt in the US, investors in China ’ s trust products are not financial institutions but private households that have very low debt ratios. While isolated cases of defaults could trigger widespread redemptions, we do not expect the vicious cycle of falling asset prices, deteriorating balance sheets and forced sell-off of assets that defined the downward spiral of the US sub-prime crisis to occur in China. We conclude that, for now, shadow banking does not amount to systemic financial risk, although it is a pressing task to improve the regulation of the shadow banking system.
出处
《国际经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第2期42-51,5,共10页
International Economic Review
