期刊文献+

核电站反应堆保护系统防共因故障设计研究 被引量:11

Design and Study on Precautions against the Common Cause Failure of Reactor Protection System for Nuclear Power Plant
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摘要 共因故障是进行核电站保护系统设计时需重点关注的风险。为了使保护系统设计能避免共因故障的发生或减轻共因故障的后果,分析了共因故障的产生原因,并对国际法规、标准的相关要求进行了研究,总结出为应对共因故障所应遵循的设计准则。最后,设计了可防止共因故障的典型反应堆保护系统架构。该保护系统架构所采用的纵深防御和多样性设计手段可作为今后核电站保护系统设计的参考。 Common cause failure (CCF) is the risk to be paid great attention during designing the protection system for nuclear power plants (NPP). To avoid the occurrence of CCF or relieving the consequence caused by CCF, the causes resulting in CCF are analyzed, the related requirements of international laws and standards are researched, and the design criteria should be followed to prevent CCF are summarized. Finally, the architecture of the typical reactor protection system to against CCF is designed. The measures of defense-in-depth and diversity adopted in this architecture will be the reference for designing NPP protection systems in future.
出处 《自动化仪表》 CAS 北大核心 2012年第2期47-50,共4页 Process Automation Instrumentation
关键词 反应堆 保护系统 共因故障 单一故障准则 纵深防御 独立性 多样性 Reactor Protection system Common cause failure (CCF) Single-failure criterion Defense-in-depth Independence Diversity
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参考文献12

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同被引文献48

  • 1田露,吴坤,刘宏春,向思宇,吴坤任.核电厂数字化反应堆保护系统多样性设计研究[J].电子技术应用,2022,48(S01):13-18. 被引量:1
  • 2徐智,雷晴,陈冬雷.CIM和DAS多样性的定量分析[J].自动化仪表,2014,35(S01):73-76. 被引量:5
  • 3郭晓明,刘涛,童节娟.核电厂数字化保护系统可靠性方法研究[J].中国核科学技术发展报告,2011核能动力分卷(上):330-337.
  • 4U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission.Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis reports for Nuclear Power Plants,'In strumentation and Controls,'. NUREG-0800 . 2007
  • 5刘宏春,王涛涛,王华金,周继翔,刘光明,许东方.岭澳二期核电站数字化反应堆保护系统[J].核动力工程,2008,29(1):1-4. 被引量:27
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  • 10US NRC.BTP7-19 guidance for evaluation of diversity and de- fense-in-depth in digital computer-based instrumentation and control system[S] ,2007.

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